The onset of the US credit crisis in 2008, and its rapid globalization induced the FED to extend unprecedented swap-lines of 30 billion dollars to four emerging markets, and the proliferation of other cross-countries selective swap arrangements. This paper explores the logic for these arrangements, focusing on the degree to which financial and trade linkages, financial openness and credit risk history account for discerning the formation of swap arrangements to EMs. We also study the impact of the formation of these credit lines on the exchange rate and the financial spreads of the relevant countries. We find that exposure of US banks to EMs is the most important selection criterion for explaining the "selected four" swap-lines. This result is consistent with the outlined model, where we show that in circumstances of unanticipated deleveraging, emergency swap-lines may prevent or mitigate costly liquidation today, allowing investment projects to reach maturity and providing positive option value to both the source and the recipient countries. The FED swap-lines had relatively large short-run impact on the exchange rates of the selected EMs, but much smaller effect on the spreads (measured relative to that of other EMs that were not the recipients of swap-lines). Specifically, non-swap countries saw an average depreciation of 0.15% on the day after swap announcement, but swap countries saw their exchange rate appreciate on average, by about 4%. Yet, all the swap countries saw their exchange rate subsequently depreciate to a level lower than pre-swap rate, calling into question the long-run impact of the arrangements.
I. Introduction and summary
The unfolding global liquidity crisis provides ample case studies of the assertion that "extraordinary times call for extraordinary action." Our case study focuses on the unprecedented provision by the FED of swap-lines to four emerging markets. While the FED extended such swaps lines to numerous OECD countries (described above), these arrangements were extended (so far) to only four emerging markets. This begs the questions what are the selection criteria explaining the "chosen four," and the degree to which these selective swaps accomplished the goals spelled out in the FED's press release.
While final evaluation of the impact of these swap-lines require much more data and longer time horizon, our preliminary results suggests that the exposure of US banks to EMs is the most important selection criterion. Adding US trade exposure, capital account openness and credit history of countries to the US banks exposure provides statistically accurate interpretation of the selected four swap-lines. This result is consistent with the model outlined in the Appendix --in circumstances of unanticipated deleveraging, emergency swap-lines prevent or mitigate costly liquidation today, thereby allowing investment projects to reach maturity. Emergency swap-lines may provide valuable services in circumstances where the realized liquidity shock turns out to be much larger than the one expected ex-ante. The impetus for "a larger than anticipated" liquidity shock may come from 'financial contagion,' or from an adverse real shock reducing the expected productivity of the investment. The first scenario is exemplified by deleveraging shocks due to credit crunch and 'flight to quality,' affecting creditors that co-financed investment in EMs. The second scenario may correspond to news about the unfolding deep global recession, a recession that may cause further deterioration of EMs terms of trade. The recent challenges facing various EMs reflect a mixture of both scenarios. An emergency swapline prevents or mitigates the depth of costly liquidation today, allowing the investment project to reach maturity. Swap-lines may also provide valuable positive option value -by averting massive liquidation today, if things improve by the end of the investment gestation period, the higher surplus would support higher profits and will reduce the ultimate cost of the capital flight, possibly enhancing the welfare of both the source and the recipient countries [i.e., the US and the four EMs].
Our analysis suggests that swap-lines had relatively large short-run impact on the exchange rates of the selected EMs, but much smaller effect on the spreads (measured relative to that of other EMs that were not the recipients of swap-lines). Specifically, Non-swap countries saw an average depreciation of 0.15% on the day after swap announcement, but swap countries saw their exchange rate appreciate on average, by about 4%. Yet, all the swap countries saw their exchange rate subsequently depreciate to a level lower than pre-swap rate, calling into question the long-run impact of the arrangements. A note of caution is in order: as the selective swap-lines targeted countries with large US exposure, it potentially prevented even a deeper exchange rate deprecation of the four. Furthermore, only with the benefit of time we would be able to appreciate the fuller welfare implications of these arrangements.
II. Explaining the Selectivity of the Arrangements
Out of the 27 markets classified as emerging markets in either the FTSE Global Equity index or the Morgan Stanley Emerging Market index or by the Economist, only four countries received emergency swap-lines from the Federal Reserve. We considered four variables that may determine the inclusion of an emerging market into the swap arrangements. These are US bank exposure to these markets, measured by the share of the individual market in the consolidated foreign claims of US banks in December 2007, the share of a country in total US goods imports and exports in 2007, the capital account openness of the country as of 2004 (Edwards, 2006 index) and the years since independence or 1800 that the country spent in default or restructuring (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008) . Table 1 presents the means of each of these variables for countries that received the swap-lines and those that did not. Countries that did not receive the swap-lines had a lower share in total US bank foreign claims (0.6 percent compared to 3 percent for swap recipients), and the difference in the two means is significant. All the swap recipient countries had the higher shares in US bank exposures than all the non-swap countries, with the exception of India which had a 3 percent share. The mean values of share in total US goods trade are also statistically significantly different between swap recipients and other EMs, but mean values of capital account openness and credit history are not. Tables 2 and 3 present results of the probit regressions that estimate the probability of inclusion into a swap arrangement with the Federal Reserve. Since we have a small sample of 27 EMs out of which only four got the swap-lines, we run probit regressions sequentially, starting with a single explanatory variable and then adding more variables. US bank exposure to these countries, measured by the share of the individual country in the consolidated foreign claims of US banks in December 2007 alone explains 64% of the variation in the dependent variable. A higher US bank exposure to a country increases its probability of getting a swap arrangement by 10.44% (evaluated at average values of regressors). If we interpret a predicted probability of inclusion of 50% or more as an inclusion prediction, then this variable alone correctly predicts 2 out of 4 swap arrangements and 22 out of 23 cases where such arrangements were not made. Each of the other explanatory variables individually have low predictive power -the pseudo R-squares are low and the coefficients of each of the variables in columns 2-4 of Table 2 are insignificant. The high percentage of correctly predicted observations is due to correct predictions of no-swaplines, which are relatively abundant in our sample. The regressions using only capital account openness or only sovereign default history do not predict a higher than 50% chance of getting a swap-line for any country. This table suggests that US bank exposure is the most important variable explaining inclusion in a swap arrangement. In Table 3 , we sequentially add other regressors to a regression with US bank exposure as an explanatory variable. In two out of the three cases with exactly two regressors, the coefficient of US bank exposure remains significant (columns 2 and 3). In the case in which it loses significance (column 1), the explanatory power of the regression rises -the US bank exposure and capital account openness together correctly predict over 92 percent of the cases (3 out of 4 swap arrangements correctly predicted and 20 out of 21 exclusions from swap arrangements).
1 The insignificance of the estimated coefficients may be due to the small sample size and non-linear relationships between explanatory variables 2 .
Adding US trade exposure to the regression with US bank exposure and capital account openness, does not increase the predictive power of the regression beyond 92%. By adding the fourth variable -the years since 1800 or independence that the country spent in sovereign default or restructuring (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008 ) -we are able to predict fully the assignment of swap arrangements. This result is driven by the high predictive power of US bank exposure.
III. Announcement Effects of the Swap Arrangements
The Moreover, the spreads for most emerging markets had already started declining before the swap arrangements were announced. To further test whether the CDS spreads in Brazil, Korea and Mexico changed more than those in other emerging markets, we look at the pre and post announcement average CDS levels. Table   5 While the announcement effects in the CDS spreads of emerging markets are not strong, the same is not true for their exchange rates. Table 6 presents the results from dummy variable regressions on the change in exchange rates on the day before the swap-line announcements and the day after. Non-swap countries saw an average depreciation of 0.15% on the day after swap announcement, but swap countries saw their exchange rate appreciate on average, by about 4%.
The two changes are statistically significantly different from each other, and the non-swap countries' depreciation is not significantly different from 0. Between the day before the announcement and the day of the announcement, the average exchange rate depreciation for non-swap countries was 1.1% and the average depreciation for swap countries at 1.7% was not significantly different. Moreover, all the swap countries saw their exchange rate subsequently depreciate to a level lower than pre-swap rate (Table 7) , calling into question the long-run impact of the arrangements.
Explaining CDS Spreads
We model the CDS spreads of a country as a function of its country risk rating (from EIU), its reserves-GDP ratio and three global variables that represent the level of liquidity in the world economy. These include the yield on 5-year US treasuries, the Center for Board Options Exchange (CBOE) VIX index of stock market volatility and the price-earnings ratio on S&P 100 index. Tables 8 and 9 (2000) panel unit root tests. There is evidence of unit root in all the variable series in at least one time series in the panel. The ADF test is unable to reject the null of a unit root for the three global series. The Nyblom Harvery test for no common trends in the CDS spreads series rejects the null, indicating that there may be co-integrating relationships.
The results of the regressions are presented in Tables 10 and 11. Table 10 presents the regressions with the full sample of countries, whereas Table 11 presents results with the balanced panel. The risk rating is included contemporaneously in some specifications and with a lead in others, to account for the fact that risk ratings are often backward looking. In all the specifications, reserves/GDP ratio enter with a negative sign, indicating that reserves accumulation lowers the CDS spreads of countries. This is consistent with our model in the appendix where the additional reserves may allow a country to avoid costly liquidation and therefore lower the cost of the probability of default. In Table 10 , the full sample regressions without time effects, every additional percentage point increase in reserves-GDP ratio reduces the CDS spread by 0.64 basis points on average. In the balanced panel (Table 11 ), the effect of additional reserves is smaller, but still significant (Columns 3 and 4 with robust standard errors).
Higher risk rating of the country and greater expected volatility in global markets also implies higher spreads.
IV. Concluding remarks
This paper studied the unprecedented provision of swaps lines by the FED to four This appendix shows that emergency swap-lines may enhance the expected utility of the source and the recipient countries following an unanticipated large deleveraging shock.
As our focus is on developing countries, we assume that all financial intermediation is done by banks, relying on a debt contract. We simplify further by assuming that there is no separation between the bank and the entrepreneur -the entrepreneur is the bank owner, using it to finance the investment. The time line is summarized in the figure below.
At the beginning of period 1, risk neutral agents deposit D in banks, which in turn use D to finance long term investment, 1 K , and hoarding reserves, R. 5 We assume that a sizable share of depositors was funded by foreign parties seeking to diversify their portfolio by means of foreign financial investment. A liquidity shock, with the aggregate value of Z for the borrowing economy, materializes at the end of period 1, after the commitment of capital. A liquidity shock exceeding reserves induces a pre-mature liquidation of Z -R. Output increases with the capital invested at the beginning of period one, 1 K , and declines with liquidation at a rate that depends 5 Our model follows the tradition of Bryant (1980) or Diamond and Dybvig (1993) in that the source of liquidity shock lies with the lender, rather than the borrower (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998) . However, our model assumes away the market equilibrium among lenders (be it the risk of runs or the difficulty of the decentralized provision of liquidity). Abstracting from the question whether market-based liquidity insurance is available, we focus on the implication of large adjustment cost-including but not restricted to the liquidation cost-on the demand for reserves as self-insurance. In a similar vein, no distinction is made between the private sector and the monetary authorities which maintain the stock of international reserves.
on the adjustment cost, θ. The liquidity shock is realized from a known distribution. The new aspect of our Appendix is that, after the realization of the liquidity shock, we add the possibility of 'black-swan' news -an unanticipated adverse shock (with probability p, the future output will decline at a rate of δ).
6 Such a shock may reflect rapid deterioration of the global economy, reducing the expected future demand for the project. Figure A1 : The time line "Black-swan" news: with probability p, productivity in period 2 will decline at a rate δ 6 The "Black-swan" concept was coined by Nassim Nicholas Taleb --an unlikely but not impossible catastrophe that no one seems to plan for. 
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function, the second period output in the absence of "black-swan" news is
; where 1 0 < ≤ θ , and 1 < α .
Recalling that
, the net capital after liquidation is:
It is convenient to normalize the liquidity shock by the level of deposits, denoting the normalized shock by z:
, and density ) (z f .
Depositors are entitled to a real return of D r on the loan that remains deposited for the duration of investment.
7 Assuming agents' subjective discount rate is ρ , competitive intermediation implies 
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MP is the marginal productivity of capital, and ] Pr[ R Z < is the probability that the liquidity shock is below the level of reserves. The expected opportunity cost of holding reserves is equalized to the expected precautionary benefit of holding reserves.
To illustrate, we consider the case with small shocks to gain the basic insight for the welfare gains associated with reserves. In the absence of uncertainty, the optimal level of deposits ( 
The first order approximation of the expected surplus can be reduced to (A8) 2
Liquidity shocks have a first order adverse effect on expected surplus. In the absence of the insurance provided by reserves, liquidation induces a deadweight loss equal to the adjustment cost, θ, times the expected liquidation. In a two states of nature case, perfect stabilization can be achieved by hoarding reserves equal to the liquidity shock:
; adjusting deposits to 
Black-swan news and emergency swap-lines
We apply the above model to understand the provisions of emergency swap-lines. To simplify, we focus first on the last example, assuming that 0 z is zero, hence the optimal demand for international reserves is zero, and the level of borrowing is given by (A6),
Suppose that at the end of period 1, after the commitment of capital, an exogenous and unanticipated "black-swan" shock reduces the expected productivity of investment. Specially, the news is that with probability p, the future output will decline at a rate of δ : D , at a contractual cost of 1 ρ + . In these circumstances, the expected utility of the source country following the "black-swan" news will be:
The swap-line improves the source country expected utility iff
Applying (A6) and (A14), the swap-lines is beneficial iff 9 We assume that in case of partial default, the realized output is fully paid to depositors.
It is easy to verify that, conditional of the black-swan news, the recipient country is better off --its surplus following the black-swan news and the bank-run would be zero. Yet, its the expected surplus with the swap-line is 
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liquidation costs (θ) are high enough, and if the size of the coming "black-swan" shock (δ) is high enough, large exposure implies that these swap arrangements are a win-win to both the source and the recipient countries. Our analysis can be extended in several ways, adding the possibility of 'self insurance' provided by international reserves, costly bankruptcies, and other relevant dimensions. 
